Yugoslavian states.
There is a real potential danger that Kosovo could descend into chaos. A stable Western Balkan region (with all regional states in both NATO and the EU) is the basic precondition for resolving Kosovo's problem. Bosnia is behind other countries in the region regarding its path toward Euro-Atlantic integration.
Bearing this in mind, and taking a logical problem solving approach moving from the less complex (Bosnia) to more complex (Kosovo) issues, Bosnia becomes the top priority in terms of untying the Balkan knot. Time is crucial in this case.
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the issue of political stability in the Western Balkans and offer some new possible Courses of Action (COAs).
A ROADMAP FOR FUTURE SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
Currently, Europe faces extremely complex issues in the Western Balkans Region, which started after Kosovo's Parliament declared independence on February 17, 2008 . Although it is not the only serious problem facing Europe, it deserves to be considered one of the most dangerous. The fact is that Kosovo does not have full recognition in the world as a state, and Belgrade looks at this issue as an opening for democratic discussion and solution finding. At the same time, this "de facto state" could easily become a "de jure state" in time. This has resulted in a significant increase in tensions not only in Serbia but also in the entire region, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), which is the most vulnerable country among all six former Yugoslavian states, mainly because of its recent history and the bloody war during Yugoslavia's breakup.
Kosovo and Bosnia are the most sensitive in the Western Balkans, and Kosovo has a dangerous potential to descend into chaos. A stable region (with all states in NATO and EU) is the basic precondition for resolving Kosovo's problem. Bosnia is behind other countries in the region regarding its path toward Euro-Atlantic (E-A) integrations because of domestic political frictions which cause failures to fulfill the conditions that have been set from the international community. This country should not be considered as an isolated issue, but rather as the easier part of solving the Balkan region's problems. The main premise here is that a stronger Bosnia, ideally as a NATO and EU member together with its neighbors, brings a higher level of stability into the region, which is an important precondition for a final solution in Kosovo. There is no doubt that the problem in Kosovo is the biggest and long-term one, while Bosnia's issue can be solved in a much shorter period of time, and Bosnia can finally become a successful part of the Balkan story.
Bearing this in mind, and taking a logical problem solving approach moving from the less complex to more complex issues, Bosnia becomes the top priority in terms of solving the Balkan knot. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the issue of political stability in the Western Balkans and offer some new possible Courses of Action (COAs).
The first step (COA-1) would be the reassert of a strong and decisive American role in Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the U.S. assert its leadership in the International Community (IC), and uses strong and decisive diplomacy in order to maintain a stable Bosnia that fulfills its all political requirements for continuing toward NATO and EU membership. Once the Bosnian political impasse is removed, the second step (COA-2) in Bosnian problem solving would be its accelerated NATO membership. This country must become part of NATO together with other Western Balkan countries. Otherwise internal Bosnian tensions will grow and it could become an undesirable option bearing in mind the unsolved Kosovo issue, as well as the possibility of growing tensions in Sandzak 1 , which lies partly in Serbia and partly in Montenegro and borders on Bosnia and Kosovo. In frame of this COA, NATO and the U.S. should relocate certain parts of their institutions into Bosnia in order to strengthen its overall position, as well as the position of the entire region. This would contribute to Bosnian and regional economic stability, which is essential in order to reach a more stable security situation. Consequently, this would set preconditions for future COAs toward Kosovo in order to cure this festering sore in Europe, which has a dangerous potential to destabilize the entire Balkan region at the time when financial crisis is straining economies and causing tensions. Furthermore, having in mind the complex economic situation in Europe, an eventual higher level conflict would likely disrupt relationships inside EU and would further threaten the survival of the EU and its monetary system. This paper seeks to demonstrate that stability in Europe is an American national interest, and that U.S. must prevent EU dissolution in order to support a stable international order and economic prosperity by preventing instability in the Balkans and Europe.
The Balkans: A Short Overview
In geographic terms, "the core regions considered are mainland Greece, Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. Inasmuch as they occasionally impact on those areas, the peripheral territories of Slovenia, Hungary, Moldavia, Anatolia, Cyprus and the Greek Aegean and Ionian islands are also briefly discussed." In demographic terms the Western Balkans is mostly made up of South Slavic peoples who speak closely related and mutually comprehensible languages. According to the analyst, "outside the region's Slavic areas, Greeks, Turks, Romanians, and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Albanians have established state traditions". 3 Generally speaking, nowadays Balkan security challenges as a whole are:
"instability resulting from the transition of market economies, exacerbated by the stagnation of the region in comparison to more developed countries; and the geostrategic position of the region, located on important routes between Europe and Asia (which are routes for the transport of oil and natural gas, but also for illegal traffic in weapons, narcotics, white slavery etc., and which could also be used for movement of various terrorist groups and to facilitate terrorist activities Generally speaking, Bosnia and Herzegovina is in a worse political position than when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed sixteen years ago. 23 Currently Bosnia faces serious challenges, especially regarding required democratic (political) reforms that are necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration. Constitutional reforms are the biggest and hardest changes that have to be made as preconditions for EU membership. Besides these reforms Bosnia has to resolve one remaining issue concerning immovable defense property in the country, which has to be registered as state property for use by the country's defense ministry, as an precondition for achieving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a Bosnian way toward NATO. 24 In addition to this, . This IC pause is not result of its strategy or even part of the IC's broader plan to give time to Bosnia for consolidation and implementation of democratic elections; it is doubtless a reflection of the IC's weakness and lack of a clear and common strategy and common leadership. 31 Time is essential for Bosnia, as well as for the entire region. Moreover, time is no less important for Europe and the internal problems the EU faces today. Losing time means losing momentum and dramatically decreasing chances for success.
European Issue as American National Interest. The European Union is based
mainly on economic interests and it struggles with its political interests that are often very different among EU (national) state members. Its extremely complicated political structure, which has direct negative reflection on common foreign and security policy, makes the European Union vulnerable from outside as well as from inside, although the first sentence in the 2003 European Security Strategy is: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free". 32 Many authors try to explain this controversial European phenomenon. Christopher J. Fettweis suggests that Europe, unlike the U.S.
("America is at war"), has a different global threat assessment and is making rational response, with weaker military power, to a low-threat international security environment. 33 Contrary to this, Robert Kagan think that the European incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance, but also to denial, and that it is normal to try to put out of one's mind that which one can do nothing about. 34 strategic environment the U.S. would have to cope with the fact that its strongest ally is preoccupied with its own escalating problems.
In sum, this overall issue fits into one U.S. core national interest directly:
promotion of values; in the worst case scenario it would have potential to reach the remaining three national interests: economic prosperity and stable international order (directly), and physical security (indirectly).
On the scale of intensity of interests, currently it is neither survival nor vital, but rather important 41 . Otherwise the PIC, as a main pillar for the mobilization of international support for the Agreement, will be useless. The PIC would be very successful under strong leadership with a clear strategy that could be implemented together with the OHR, the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and OSCE with a decisive and united approach.
Options (Ways). Given that the problem in
At the same time, OSCE already has a U.S. Ambassador as a head of mission, so it can be the main body that could either facilitate or mediate internal political discussions, depending on how the situation develops 43 . Everything must be followed by strong diplomatic engagements in countries that are signatories to the Dayton Agreement in order to gain their support that would encourage Bosnia's politicians to bridge current problems; this could be done with existing U.S. Embassies. diplomatic activities would be necessary in NATO in order to ensure Bosnian membership once the Bosnian political impasse is removed. Everything would be supported by informational means, the main role of which would be to make this process transparent, to keep public informed, and to gain public support in pursuit of the objective as well as for these diplomatic activities at home and abroad. Regarding the suitability of diplomatic means, they are more suitable in options 2 and 3 than in the first one, because of their stronger approach that makes them more decisive and gives them better chances for success.
Informational means of power in options 2 and 3 are also feasible (the U.S. has such means), acceptable (legal, ethical, and worth the cost) and suitable (helps to achieve the objective), while economic means of power are acceptable and suitable, but perhaps not feasible (having in mind current economic constraints). Selection of the Best Option. Accordingly to the FAST, the second option is the most appropriate one; this option (way) currently the best support for fulfillment of the objective (end) with broader diplomatic and informational power (means).
Strategic Consequences for the U.S. Bearing in mind American national
interests, it is possible to conclude that a failure to take the initiative will result in negative consequences, and vice versa, positive measures will result in positive strategic consequences.
Possible Negative Strategic Consequences -in case the U.S. does NOT take
the proposed actions toward Bosnia. The EU already has tremendous internal economic problems which threaten to disassemble this community and its monetary system. In this position, with its complex political and security structure (and conglomerate of different national interests), the EU is not able to solve Balkan problems by itself.
Europe was in a much better economic position during the 1990s, when Richard Holbrooke stated that "institutional structure makes it hard for Europe to use its full moral, political, and diplomatic authority in a coherent and consistent way." 45 Although the EU has made a lot of organizational and structural changes and certain improvements since that time, the basic problem pointed by to Holbrooke remains the same.
Kosovo has huge potential to slide into chaos, which can spread through the entire region. Time is crucial and works against Bosnia and the Balkan region. Status quo does not mean a frozen situation, but rather going backward. Losing time means losing momentum and dramatically decreasing the chances for success. In short, "doing nothing now risks a far greater and more costly involvement later". 46 It follows that there is a huge risk for EU dissolution, which threatens to change the current international order and would have direct repercussions on U.S. economic prosperity. The strongest U.S. ally could become preoccupied by its own escalating problems and need U.S. military support. Then the U.S. would be required to stretch its efforts between Europe and other world-wide issues, which would be incomparably more costly than immediate diplomatic engagement.
Besides this, the absence of U.S. leadership in the International Community would provide an opportunity for other big players to try to insert themselves as leaders, or to have covert influence in the European region, solving problems but in a way that suits their own objectives. Relocations would be mutually beneficial. It would not only bring security and economic benefits to the region, but also financial benefits to the U.S. and NATO. The entire region will be open to this idea, and will be able to offer military facilities, since the all militaries have been downsized in the last few decades and left behind numerous military locations. Furthermore, it is expected that these locations would be offered for minimal cost or even for free, depending on the requirements for their reconstruction and adaptation for new purposes. The initial cost would not be small, but bearing in mind that the labor and cost of living in Bosnia and the whole region are far cheaper than those in Western Europe, this undoubtedly would become cost effective over a longer period of time.
The American public's reaction will strongly depends on the way that it is informed about relocation, which will save money and maintain a U.S. presence in Europe with a more appropriate distribution of power and resources.
Expected Western European reaction should be "abstaining positive", heaving in mind simultaneously two opposite events: lost some jobs of civilians and private sector mainly in Germany and Belgium (Brussels) simultaneously with strengthen European
South-East region in order to get more stable Europe itself.
Though these measures will draw the attention of Russia as the biggest NATO opponent, Moscow should not have serious objection or launch any severe counter reaction. The Russian reactions will occur during the process of admission of these countries into NATO, and must be alleviated by strong diplomacy. Once the entire Western Balkan region becomes part of a collective security system, the geographical gap between Western and Eastern NATO countries will be filled, and regrouping of headquarters and/or units as well as educational centers would be part a normal adaptation to the completely new situation in Europe.
In short, completion of this COA, which has for its objective to accelerate Bosnian NATO membership in order to set conditions for the simultaneous admission of all regional countries into NATO, and further strengthening Western Balkan area with a NATO and U.S. presence, would finally create preconditions for a long term solution to the Kosovo problem.
Final Considerations, Conclusion and Proposal
Before 1999, the great powers had intervened three times in the Balkans. …These three interventions were so destructive that they that guaranteed the Balkans' relative economic backwardness, compared to the rest of Europe. And the violence that these interventions encouraged, often conflicted by one Balkan people on another, ensured the continuation of profound civil and nationalist strife. In the West, however, these events are rarely regarded as the result of the external intervention. On the contrary, the Balkans countries are seen as culprits who force the reluctant outside powers into their unfathomable conflicts. This imagined Balkans -a world where people are motivated not by rational considerations but by mysterious congenital bloodthirstiness -is always invoked when great power seek to deny their responsibility for the economic and political difficulties that the region has suffered as a consequence of the external interference. 48 Today's political, economic and security conditions in the Western Balkans are the after effects created by the international interventions in recent history. This paper does not intent to argue over whom to blame for the Balkans overall position, or to discuss what would have happened if there was no IC intervention, but rather to state clearly that the international community has an obligation to help out in this region.
The unquestionable fact is that today the positions of Kosovo and Bosnia are shaped and created by the International Community's military, diplomatic, economic and informational means, and this is unfinished process which cannot be ended properly without outside help. Unfortunately, the IC is not capable of helping despite the fact that it has mechanisms to do so. More precisely, the IC does not have unity which leads to a lack of common strategy and common leadership, without strong and decisive approach and clear course of action.
America has left a strong foot print in this region, particularly in Bosnia and also in Kosovo, while turning over responsibilities to Europe which should carry the burden for civilian reconstruction. In the meantime Kosovo declared independence, which has led to a rise of tensions in the entire region, especially in Bosnia where coincidently all progress has been slowed down or stopped. Given that this European issue can affect different American national interests and also can vary on the scale of intensity of interests depending on the situation, the U.S. must not look at it like at someone else's problem. It has to take some actions for moral and pragmatic reasons toward the Western Balkan crisis in order to prevent the worst case scenario: escalating conflicts in Europe, and the dissolution of the EU and its monetary system. This paper proposes that the U.S. should take a leadership role in the IC, and use strong and decisive diplomacy in order to maintain a stable Bosnia that fulfills all Everything stated above is necessary, although not sufficient, for true stability and long-term economic recovery and its re-growth in the Balkans and in Europe as whole. In other words, it would be "a regional framework capable of promoting development, encouraging reconciliation, and sustaining peace". 49 "Yet, if the great powers fail to seize the present opportunity by investing heavily in the region", writes Misha Glenny, "the suffering of the Balkans will surely continue…" 50 , but this time Balkans would not suffer in isolation as it did during 1990s -this time its suffering would be shared with and returned to the disunited and deeply divided creators of its current political landscape.
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